Abigail Leigh successfully obtained two Forced Marriage Protection Orders (FMPO) on behalf of Devon and Cornwall Police, each for 7 years

Abigail Leigh successfully obtained two Forced Marriage Protection Orders (FMPO) on behalf of Devon and Cornwall Police, each for 7 years. The case involved allegations of threats to kidnap, kill and harvest organs unless the victim married the respondent.

A summary on the law of Forced Marriage Protection Orders is summarised below and was commended and adopted by the judge in Abigail’s case.

The court’s power to grant a FMPO in Section 63A Family Law Act 1996 (my emphasis)

“(1) The court may make an order for the purposes of protecting—

(a) a person from being forced into a marriage or from any attempt to be forced into a marriage; or

(b) a person who has been forced into a marriage.

(2) In deciding whether to exercise its powers under this section and, if so, in what manner, the court must have regard to all the circumstances including the need to secure the health, safety and well-being of the person to be protected.

(3) In ascertaining that person’s well-being, the court must, in particular, have such regard to the person’s wishes and feelings (so far as they are reasonably ascertainable) as the court considers appropriate in the light of the person’s age and understanding.

(4) For the purposes of this Part a person (“A”) is forced into a marriage if another person (“B”) forces A to enter into a marriage (whether with B or another person) without A’s free and full consent.

(5)For the purposes of subsection (4) it does not matter whether the conduct of B which forces A to enter into a marriage is directed against A, B or another person.

(6) In this Part—

“force” includes coerce by threats or other psychological means (and related expressions are to be read accordingly); and

“forced marriage protection order” means an order under this section.”

The case of Re K [2020] EWCA Civ 190 sets out the route map to judgment [46-55] (my emphasis)

“46.      Stage One is for the court to establish the underlying facts based upon admissible evidence and by applying the civil standard of proof. The burden of proof will ordinarily be upon the applicant who asserts the facts that are said to justify the making of a FMPO. Where an application for a FMPO is contested at an on notice hearing it will be necessary for the court to determine any relevant factual issues. In the course of her August 2018 judgment, HHJ Tucker referred to Re A (Forced Marriage: Special Advocates) [2010] EWHC 2438 (Fam). She observed that in Re A Sir Nicholas Wall P “emphasised the protective and injunctive nature of a FMPO and expressed the view that it did not depend on a complex factual matrix so that the decision could be made without detailed investigation of the factual issues.”

…

50. At Stage Two, based on the facts that have been found, the court should determine whether or not the purpose identified in FLA 1996, s 63A(1) is established, namely that there is a need to protect a person from being forced into a marriage or from any attempt to be forced into a marriage, or that a person has been forced into a marriage.
51. At Stage Three, based upon the facts that have been found, the court must then assess both the risks and the protective factors that relate to the particular circumstances of the individual who is said to be vulnerable to forced marriage. This is an important stage and the court may be assisted by drawing up a balance sheet of the positives and negatives within the circumstances of the particular family in so far as they may relate to the potential for forced marriage.
52. At the conclusion of Stage Three, the court must explicitly consider whether or not the facts as found are sufficient to establish a real and immediate risk of the subject of the application suffering inhuman or degrading treatment sufficient to cross the ECHR, Article 3, threshold.
53. At Stage Four, if the facts are sufficient to establish a risk that the subject will experience conduct sufficient to satisfy ECHR, Article 3, the court must then undertake the exercise of achieving an accommodation between the necessity of protecting the subject of the application from the risk of harm under Article 3 and the need to respect their family and private life under Article 8 and, within that, respect for their autonomy. This is not a strict “balancing” exercise as there is a necessity for the court to establish the minimum measures necessary to meet the Article 3 risk that has been established under Stage Three.
54. In undertaking the fourth stage, the court should have in mind the high degree of flexibility which is afforded to the court by the open wording of FLA 1996, s 64A. In each case, the court should be encouraged to establish a bespoke order which pitches the intrusion on private and family life at the point which is necessary in order to meet the duty under Article 3, but no more. The length of the order, the breadth of the order and the elements within the order should vary from case-to-case to reflect the particular factual context; this is not a jurisdiction that should ordinarily attract a template approach.
55. In assessing the length of time that any provision within a FMPO is in force, the court should bear in mind that the circumstances within any family, and relating to any individual within such a family, may change. It is unlikely in all but the most serious and clear cases that the court will be able to see far enough into the future to make an open-ended order which will remain in force unless and until it is varied or terminated by a subsequent application. In other cases, the court should look as far as it can in assessing risk but no further. The court should first consider whether a finite order adequately meets the risk, with the consequence (if it does) that the applicant for the order will have to seek a further order at the end of the term if further protection is then needed. A date should be fixed on which the order, or a specific provision within it, is reviewed by the court.”

Additional case law regarding duration is as follows:

Re K (forced marriage: passport order) [2020] EWCA Civ 190 confirmed that an indefinite period for a passport order can be ordered and at [67]

“67. Whilst the breadth and flexibility of the court’s jurisdiction applies to the making of a passport order just as it may apply to any other element within a FMPO, I agree with Ms Fottrell’s submission that the authorities establish that an open-ended passport order or travel ban should only be imposed in the most exceptional of cases and where the court can look sufficiently far into the future to be satisfied that highly restrictive orders of that nature will be required indefinitely. In all other cases, the court should impose a time limit when making such orders. The time limit will vary from case-to-case and, like all other elements, be a bespoke provision imposing a restriction only in so far as that is justified on the facts as found. Unless the court can see with clarity that there will be no need for any continuing order after a particular date, for example when it is clear that the circumstances will change so that the risk is removed, the appropriate course will be for the court to list the matter for further review a short time before the passport and/or travel ban will otherwise expire.”

A v SM and HB (Forced Marriage Protection Orders) [2012] 2 FLR 1077 confirmed in circumstances an FMPO can be made without limit of time at [27].

In this case, the Police brought the application on behalf of the victim and permission was sought and granted at the first hearing.

It is relatively unusual to have an FMPO in Devon and Cornwall, and a similar comparison to those practitioners who are not familiar with them is a non-molestation order. It is important to remember to use the most up-to-date Standard Orders, which outline the framework for the FMPO and can be a helpful starting point.

A favourable argument for these orders is that it is illegal to force a marriage in the UK and therefore an FMPO has limited interference with the victims or respondents human rights. However, the additional orders seeking to limit the respondent from entering an area, communicating with the victim or leaving England and Wales are a greater interference and therefore well thought through arguments and potential additional evidence will be needed to justify these orders. This is a practical consideration to keep in mind.

Abigail Leigh is a family barrister at KBG Chambers (Call: 2022) who takes instructions in private children, injunctions, care and matrimonial finance. She has regular repeat instructions and is commended on her advocacy and client care. In 2025, Abigail won the Cornwall Junior Law Society’s Junior Barrister of the Year 2025. She is also an Assistant Lecturer at the University of the West of England, part-time, where she lectures on the Bar Training Course (drafting, opinion writing and ethics) and on the Family Law master’s module. Abigail completed her undergraduate law degree with a First and the Bar Training Course with an outstanding and a distinction in her law masters, both at UWE.